Ukraine Overhauls Military Structure to Counter Russian Pressure

Recently, after over three years of fighting, weaknesses in Ukraine’s force organization have become clearer. Using years of experience, Ukraine has begun overhauling how its ground forces are organized, shifting away from an overstretched brigade model to a corps-based system aimed at fixing systemic weaknesses. 

The goal of this reform is to close the weak spots in Ukraine’s defensive lines that Russia has repeatedly exploited. These include gaps between units, slow coordination under fire, and breaking up command across brigade-level formations. By creating larger, unified corps commands, Ukraine hopes to better absorb Russian pressure and create a better-organized defense.

The reason why Ukraine wants to achieve this goal is that the existing brigade system, while initially flexible and fast to mobilize, has created several problems as the war has dragged on. A frontline made up of over one hundred ten brigades results in roughly one hundred nine splits between areas of responsibility. These splits are often the focus of Russian attacks, aiming to drive a wedge between two brigades. This means that to repel the attack, two brigades have to coordinate perfectly under stress, something that cannot always succeed in the chaos of the battlefield.

Notable examples include the failed rotation at Ocheretyne, Russians taking advantage of splits near Velyka Novosilka, and the overwhelming of a single brigade at Lozova. Additionally, each brigade has developed its own way of operating, including differences in how they conduct assaults, manage artillery, or organize communication lines, making inter-brigade cooperation more difficult, especially during large offensive operations.

To fix these issues, Ukraine is forming a new army corps that groups brigades under centralized, battle-proven leadership. Each corps is structured around a central elite brigade, such as the third Assault Brigade or Azov, which sets the operational standard and stabilizes the command environment.

These corps allow a more combined way of operating, shared support, and better planning across units. Corps commanders, chosen from Ukraine’s most experienced officers, gain the ability to allocate firepower, move reserves, and counter threats without waiting for agreements between brigades. They can also coordinate logistics and support assets more efficiently, improving unit survivability during longer engagements.

These formations also help Ukraine develop an operational command layer that was previously underdeveloped, a critical improvement for long-term warfare. Each corps will command an area of responsibility roughly fifty to seventy kilometers wide, giving its leadership control over a large but manageable slice of the front. Altogether, the reform is expected to include eighteen to twenty brigades, each equipped with dedicated mechanized, artillery, air defense, engineering, and drone units. 

The corps system also provides a framework for standardizing logistics, training, and tactics, something Ukraine has lacked until now. 

Still, there are real holdups. Ukraine cannot field a fully functional corps overnight. These new formations require trained staff, joint-up logistics, and a consistent way of operating, none of which are easy to organize during wartime. Some brigades may resist giving up independent control, and Ukraine faces a shortage of experienced mid-level officers to support corps-level operations. 

But these challenges are being addressed in real time, including accelerated staff training programs and joint command drills at the corps level.

Ukraine is already putting this system into practice. The Azov and Third Assault Army Corps, both built around Ukraine’s most battle-proven and prominent brigades, are leading the way as flagship formations in this reform, as discussed in previous reports. Additionally, a dedicated Airborne and National Guard Corps will band already dedicated units together for increased effectiveness. These corps are not just bureaucratic shifts, they represent real improvements in how Ukraine plans, coordinates, and fights, both on the offense and defense. 

Elements of these corps have already been deployed in key sectors, giving Ukraine a chance to test how well the corps structure improves coordination, response times, and multi-unit planning under real combat pressure.

Overall, while the brigade-system has proven itself exceptionally effective throughout the war, Ukraine’s army corps reform is a direct answer to the structural weaknesses exposed during years of hard fighting; an improvement in organization as the war continues to evolve. It brings stronger leadership, coordination, and reduced division at the front. The corps model will give Ukraine an improved ability to hold its ground and shape future operations on its own terms. If successful, the corps model could become the foundation for a continued Ukrainian defense and offense as the war continues.