The Rise and Fall of Russian Motorbike Warfare

Russian ground assault tactics are continuously evolving and shaping the battlefield as much as the battlefield shapes their tactics, with motorbike assaults taking a prominent role.

However, Ukrainian counterplays are growing rapidly with them, and the decoy soldiers intended to distract the Ukrainians have now become the Russians’ main way of attacking instead.

At the start of the Russian summer offensive, it became clear that a new way of attacking would become dominant throughout their campaign, with motorbike-mounted assault groups becoming a central feature of Russian summer tactics.

However, this development did not come out of nowhere, as currently, the biggest hurdle Russian forces are trying to overcome is Ukrainian drones, and more specifically, the drone line initiative Ukrainians are increasingly implementing, striking Russian movements further and further back.

This so-called wall of drones would detect any Russian armored assault or large infantry concentration long before they had a chance to storm Ukrainian lines. 33333Therefore, the first real Russian tactics utilizing motorbike-mounted soldiers evolved as a counter to this reality, as they were fast and agile; more difficult to hit than slow-moving and large Russian armored vehicles.

As Russian forces sought to counteract increasing Ukrainian drone dominance, they began prioritizing speed and dispersion in their assault doctrine, first tested near Toretsk. First, Russians would send about 10 groups numbering 2 to 3 infantrymen on foot to draw out Ukrainian fire and distract the large number of drones in the air.

Next, with Ukrainian drones distracted by having to hunt down all these groups, a concentrated force of motorbikes would rush forward to engage and clear out a Ukrainian position. If successful, an armored spearhead would then follow up to exploit the gap and penetrate deeper into Ukrainian lines.

However, because this tactic was still in early development, the results were lacking. As Russians continued trying to perfect this tactic, Ukrainians busied themselves trying to find the ideal counter to it as well.

While motorbikes had the advantage of agility, they also became increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainians recalibrating their anti-personnel mines, as well as tripwires linked to claymores positioned on the side of the roads. Additionally, we saw the Ukrainian 63rd brigade at Lyman utilizing the ancient Roman tactic of deploying caltrops to halt such enemy charges.

Lastly, Ukrainians started increasingly utilizing Egoza-type razor wire to block off areas to Russian motorbikes and infantry alike.

Russian attempts to adapt to these simple and efficient counters repeatedly met failures. Such as at Kostiantynivka, Russians tried to lead with a mechanized assault instead, hoping to clear any mines and obstacles for motorbike infantry to follow in their tracks.

However, this ran into the same problem as any previous Russian assault, with the armor simply being quickly destroyed by drones. When the motorbikes tried to follow up, Ukrainian artillery crews were already aimed right at their vector of assault.

In trying to deal with razor wire, Russians published training footage of a sacrificial soldier who would crash his motorbike into the wire, with others then riding over the bike and across the obstacle. However, Ukrainians put down razor wire up to 5 rows deep and two high, and this maneuver never became successful outside of training exercises.

Notably, the biggest flaw causing these Russian motorbike tactics to fail is a distinct lack of armor to follow up with, and even if they do launch the armored follow-up, their vehicles are stationed too far from the front that by the time they reach the contact line, Ukrainian drones already swarm the air and can rapidly destroy the armored assault.

However interestingly enough, the small groups of infantry that were supposed to only distract Ukrainian drones from the main assault have been much more successful in achieving territorial gains. The manpower shortage on the Ukrainian lines often causes these groups to successfully infiltrate behind Ukrainian defenses and conduct assaults from there.

Overall, Russians had banked on tactics centered around their new motorbike soldiers to make rapid gains in the summer. However, as Ukrainians equally continued to develop efficient countermeasures, their effectiveness has fallen off.

Now, Russians have banked hard on the success of infiltration tactics instead, adapting their methods to support these assaults, resulting in the relatively rapid but extremely costly Russian gains we are seeing today.

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