Recently, Russia launched 355 Shahed drones and nine cruise missiles in a single night, the largest aerial assault since the war began. This is no longer a probing tactic. It is an all-out effort to overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses through sheer volume.

The goal for Ukraine is to intercept daily drone and missile waves without relying on high-cost, ground-based systems. While Ukraine has successfully deployed nasams, iris-T, and other interceptors, these come with expensive missiles and a limited supply. Ukraine also fields mobile air defense teams, trucks, and boats fitted with autocannons, which provide some flexibility. But their coverage is limited, and they cannot keep pace with fast, low-flying drones.

The F-sixteen offers a more versatile alternative: an airborne platform that can engage threats quickly, repeatedly, and across a wide geographic area.

The reason why Ukraine shifts their interception strategy is that Russia’s drone campaign is built on attrition. The Shahed drone costs between 20,000 and 50,000 US dollars per unit. According to Ukrainian reconnaissance commander Yaroslavsky, Russia may soon be capable of producing up to 500 Shahed drones per day. In their recent massive strike campaign, Russia has already launched as many as 355 drones in a single night according to Ukrainian officials. These drones are not just meant to destroy, they are designed to drain. Each time Ukraine fires a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars at a 30,000 dollar drone, the balance tips further in Russia’s favor. Ukraine aims to flip that logic and make drone interceptions cheaper than drone production.

In order to achieve this goal, Ukraine is integrating F-sixteens into routine drone patrols. The Netherlands has now delivered all 24 of its pledged aircraft. These jets are not being used for air superiority. Instead, they are intercepting drones using cannon fire or aim-9M Sidewinder missiles, older systems that are still effective. With an estimated cost of around 4,000 dollars per flight hour, including fuel, weapons, and maintenance, means that each Shahed downing can cost under 10,000 dollars.

Just as important, each jet can cover a patrol radius of up to 500 kilometers, far beyond the reach of any mobile gun truck or fixed missile system.

The result is a more sustainable air defense model. F-sixteens absorb the volume of Shaheds, preserving high-end interceptors for missiles or manned aircraft. They ease the load on mobile teams and allow Ukraine to project air defense beyond dense urban centers. Ukraine already maintains a layered air defense network, however the F-sixteen adds a highly cost-effective aerial layer that strengthens its ability to respond flexibly to different types of threats.

The F-sixteen’s role in Ukraine’s air defense is growing even more important, as new variants of Russian Shahed drones now fly faster than 200 kilometers per hour, can resist GPS jamming, and carry 90-kilogram warheads with shaped-charges, fragmentation, and thermobaric warheads. Some can reportedly dive on targets at over 400 kilometers per hour. These enhancements make them harder to intercept but also make them more expensive and less disposable.

F-sixteens are much more capable of downing these faster and more deadly Russian drones than ground-based gun or missile systems.

To counter Ukraine’s growing interception capabilities, Russia may try to flood wider flight corridors, increase jamming efforts, or target F-sixteen airfields. But none of these are low-cost options. Jamming requires more specialized equipment and energy, and targeting airfields that host Western-supplied jets may be more easily said than done, with Ukraine deeply understanding the need to protect these invaluable assets. The F-sixteen’s ability to patrol across regions means that dispersing drones no longer guarantees a breach. For every adaptation Russia makes, its cost per strike rises.

Overall, the arrival of F-sixteens has reshaped Ukraine’s air defense from a race to resupply into a strategy of endurance. These jets do not shift the balance of air superiority due to the number of jets delivered, but they do change the terms of engagement. By cutting the cost of each interception and pushing Russia into more expensive attacks, Ukraine is maintaining the cost-effective edge in the air. As Russia continues to push their efforts into a war of attrition, where resources are finite and time favors the better-managed side, this shift is as strategic as it is economic.

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