Today, the biggest news comes from Donetsk region.
Here, the ongoing deception war between the two sides has taken a new turn as Ukraine continues to develop advanced methods to mislead Russian forces. As Ukrainian forces recently stepped up their decoy enhancement tactics, Russia's targeting efforts have been further complicated, wasting valuable resources.

Newly released footage shows a mock vehicle with a rotating turret designed to mislead Russian forces and loitering munitions. Adding movement to decoys is a game-changer, as modern targeting systems rely on behavioral cues such as turret movement and heat signatures to distinguish real targets from fake ones. The rotating turret, paired with realistic details like tracks in the dirt and dummy ammo crates, makes it harder for Russian forces to identify decoys.


This tactic has already proven successful, as Ukrainian forces have previously used cluttered environments to lure Russian drones, such as the Lancets. With these moving decoys, Russia faces higher costs and risks as its reliance on drones and tracking activity to find targets is disrupted, forcing operators to either waste munitions on fake targets or slow their engagement process.

This buys Ukraine more time to protect real assets while analysts note that a decoy arms race during the war has made mechanical motion the next step to confuse both human and AI-assisted spotters. Decoys are highly effective when they resemble real military assets, with studies and field reports indicating that decoys mimicking real vehicles in terms of shape, context, movement, and thermal signature are harder to identify as a fake, increasing the likelihood that the enemy will fire at them.

Reports from outlets like National Interest and Forbes emphasize how advanced decoys force Russia to waste resources, protect Ukraine’s platforms, and make Russian forces treat every target as potentially real, ultimately draining Russian munitions. The cost-exchange logic is clear; investing in decoys is far cheaper than the resources Russia expends when they mistakenly target them. A sophisticated mock-up costs just a few hundred to a thousand dollars, whereas Russian munitions can range from 30,000 to 100,000 dollars, or 3 million for larger missiles. Companies supplying Ukraine, like Inflatech, which produces inflatable decoys of HIMARS, tanks, and howitzers, saw increased demand as military forces recognized the effectiveness of these decoys. Modern motion-capable mockups, featuring motors, gearboxes, and controllers, provide even better returns by enhancing the believability of the decoys. This added technology is minimal compared to the cost of enemy missiles and lost tempo.

As Russia develops its own decoy and swarming tactics, Ukraine’s new decoy upgrades ensure they maintain the edge in deception. Moving turrets not only mislead optics but also generate false positives in automated target recognition systems, increasing the likelihood of misfires from autonomous systems that prioritize dynamic signatures.

While decoys are not a new tactic for Ukraine, their use has evolved over the years. Since the start of the conflict, Ukraine has deployed inflatable decoys, mock artillery, and Himars, employing clever staging techniques to deceive enemy sensors. Crews have staged realistic scenes by adding wheel ruts, scattered crates, and even latrines, moving real systems after firing and positioning decoys in their place to lure counterbattery strikes, such as often done with Himars. The addition of motion to these decoys marks a significant development in the ongoing decoy strategy.

Throughout 2024 and 2025, reports have tracked the decoy arms race, focusing on the production of advanced decoy tanks and the broader competition. This latest footage builds on a history of incremental deception tactics, reinforcing Ukraine’s ability to scale affordable innovations across brigades. For a military with limited supplies of armored vehicles, crews, and pilots, decoys are a vital tool for force preservation, while also imposing costs on Russian reconnaissance and strike networks.

Overall, Ukraine’s use of mock vehicles with moving turrets is a practical, incremental upgrade with significant effects. These decoys sharpen the illusion precisely where Russian operators must decide whether to shoot, draining Russian munitions, attention, and time while protecting Ukraine’s real assets. The innovation deepens existing deception strategies, blending proven tricks with motion to challenge both human and algorithmic target validation.

With Ukraine’s track record of fielding cost-effective tech at scale, these motion-capable decoys are likely to multiply across the front, tightening the feedback loop that makes every fake target seem just real enough to destroy.

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