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Recently, Ukraine’s ability to hold the line has improved thanks to layered defenses and better coordination. But holding the line is not enough; killing the offensive means attacking Russian logistics before assaults even begin.
If Russian forces are well-fed, armed, and rotated, they can keep grinding forward, no matter how many they lose. But when supplies dry up, attacks thin out, momentum slows, and Ukrainian positions are no longer overwhelmed.
This is not just theory; it has already been proven. In Kherson, Ukrainian strikes on Dnipro bridges and ferry lines forced a Russian withdrawal. In Kursk, drone strikes on Ukrainian logistics lines forced Ukrainian units to withdraw from the region. And around Pokrovsk, units under General Drapaty disrupted Russian build-ups with coordinated hits on staging areas and movements to the frontline.
Each case highlights the same principle: logistics attrition limits combat power before it reaches the battlefield, forcing much larger operations to come to a halt.
Still, building this into an actual logistics war will take more than tech or doctrine. It requires setting priorities and exploiting chokepoints. Russian logistics start from large, concentrated munition depots and military bases, from which supplies are transferred by rail to depots and bases closer to the war. From there, the supplies are distributed closer and closer to the front line, until the guns and ammunition are actively being used in combat. In other words, Russia’s system is large but vulnerable; it relies on rail bottlenecks, exposed staging hubs, and long truck convoys that stretch from bases in Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov.
These are not infinite. If Ukraine can destroy key hubs and transport lines, such as railways, before offensives begin, the result is fewer supplies, less armor, and slower rotations. Even if Russia compensates by rerouting, that takes time, during which the offensive tempo slows down, exactly what Ukraine needs to reinforce and rotate its forces. It is not about total disruption; it is about making every Russian battalion that shows up at the frontline slightly smaller, weaker, and easier to destroy.
The final, and most devastating, phase targets the frontline itself, key supply routes as Russian forces approach the contact line. In Pokrovsk, for example, Ukrainian drones turned 300-500m stretches of asphalt into roads of death, with dozens of burnt-out vehicles and hundreds of bodies littering the approaches, still kilometers away from actually seeing Ukrainian soldiers. Disrupting supply convoys at that final stage denies reinforcements and munitions at the most critical moment, ensuring attacks arrive scarcely equipped and are far less effective.
Right now, that same opportunity exists, but it is not yet being used at scale. Ukrainian drone and sabotage units hit fuel depots, rail nodes, and large storage hubs every week. From Belgorod to Donetsk, dozens of strikes have slowed deliveries and forced emergency rerouting.
The appointment of Robert Brovdi, former commander of Magyar’s Birds, as head of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces marks a turning point: he plans to integrate drone units under strategic command, fold them into the wider ‘’Drone Line’’ project, and prioritize logistics strikes up to 15 km behind enemy lines He has openly stated his goal of linking drones to a unified command structure.
That initiative overlaps with Ukraine’s ‘’Drone Line’’ program, which seeks to fuse real-time drone targeting with artillery and ground strikes to hit Russian movements up to 15 kilometers behind enemy lines.
There are already signs this approach works. In recent weeks, Ukrainian drone strikes have hit supply depots in occupied Horlivka, burned a Russian locomotive near Belgorod, and disabled rail sections near the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. In Pokrovsk, Ukrainian FPV’s and artillery now regularly stop incoming soldiers and equipment before they even unload. Ammunition, replacement vehicles, and rotating manpower are becoming increasingly vulnerable. That is where a real campaign needs to focus.
Overall, Ukraine’s defenses can hold the lines, but only if the tempo of Russian attacks drops. And the only reliable way to reduce that tempo is by destroying the supply chains that allow those attacks to happen. Ukraine does not need to starve every Russian unit. It just needs to hit fast, hit smart, and keep hitting until the offensive force is no longer overwhelming. The path to victory runs through railway yards, truck routes, and staging areas, not just trenches.
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