Russian defenses improve but fail to restore control of lost waters

Today, there are interesting updates from the Black Sea.

Here, Russia is trying to stop the Ukrainian naval drone campaign that already forced its Black Sea Fleet out of Crimea. But while Russian drones are now intercepting Ukrainian sea drones more often, the real question is whether this is a comeback or simply more time bought for a fleet that still cannot return to the waters it lost.

Ukraine’s naval drone attacks changed the war in the Black Sea because they gave Kyiv a cheap way to threaten some of Russia’s most valuable naval assets. Operating with a fleet of its own, Ukraine sent semi-submersible drones against warships, patrol vessels, and port infrastructure, forcing Russia to defend against attacks that could appear with very little warning.

Sea drones are difficult to stop because they have a small profile above the water surface and operate at a relatively low speed, which makes them hard to detect. The damage they caused mattered, as these repeated attacks destroyed not only enemy assets but the Russian sense that Crimea was a safe area to operate from.

This caused one of the most important strategic effects of the war, as the Russian Black Sea Fleet pulled back from its forward positions in Russian-controlled Crimea and relocated eastward to Novorossiysk. That move made the remnants of the fleet harder to hit, but it also reduced its freedom to shape events near Ukraine’s coast. So even without destroying the whole fleet outright, Ukraine managed to push it out of the part of the sea that mattered most for both sides.

However, that early momentum has slowed, as Russia has closed some of the gaps that once made repeated Ukrainian naval drone strikes so dangerous. The main reason is that Russia appears to have built a more coordinated response around aerial drones. Reconnaissance drones such as ZALA are now being used to detect Ukrainian surface drones at greater distances, giving Russian forces more time to react before Ukrainian drones reach ships or port areas. Once they are spotted, Russian Lancet loitering munitions can be directed and used to destroy them.\

In practice, Russia has created a kill chain that links detection and interception into one process, using systems it already had but had not previously combined effectively, without achieving a major technological breakthrough. As a result, Ukraine now has to fight through a more organized defensive system before its drones can reach high-value targets.

Yet, the current phase of the war in the Black Sea should not be mistaken for a full Russian recovery. Tactically, Russia is indeed performing better because it has found a more efficient way to intercept incoming Ukrainian sea drones. However, the Ukrainian naval drone strategy still defines the battlespaces, as the Russian Black Sea Fleet remains pinned and exposed to new strikes even in Novorossiysk, while still not being able to operate near Crimea and the western Black Sea with the same confidence it once had.

Overall, Russia’s new countermeasures are helping it contain the immediate danger, but they have not allowed it to restore control of the Black Sea or even the presence it had before. The fleet may be harder to hit now, yet it still operates from a position of caution because Ukraine has already proved that even the eastern parts of the sea are not secure for Russians to hide in. This means Russian tactical defenses are buying some time for the Russian command without being able to reverse the earlier strategic loss. And as long as the Black Sea Fleet remains stuck in Novorossiysk and reduced to a sitting target instead of returning to Crimea, Russia is still hanging on by a thread.